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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Administrative Agencies . Subpoena Power. Relevancy . Right of Privacy
Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Lopez,
216 Kan. 108, 531 P.2d 455 (1975)
A DIVIDED KANSAS SUPREME COURT, in Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe
Ry. Co. v. Lopez,' upheld a subpoena by the Kansas Civil Rights
Commission which required the railway company to supply the Commission
with the complete personnel records, including arrest and conviction records,
of all employees within the job classification of "trackman."'
On April 4, 1972, Arnold Lopez, a Mexican-American, applied for
employment as a "trackman" with the Sante Fe. A subsequent check of Lopez'
criminal record revealed 20 convictions for various offenses including
drunkenness, driving while intoxicated, assault and battery, resisting arrest,
and numerous traffic offenses.' On April 14, 1972, Sante Fe informed Lopez
that his application had not been approved."
Lopez then filed a complaint with the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights
alleging that Sante Fe had terminated his employment on account of his
national origin, and therefore in violation of the Kansas Act Against
Discrimination." The Commission, upon initial investigation, determined that
Lopez had been terminated because of his police record.' It then centered its
investigation on the question of whether Sante Fe had considered Lopez'
police record in accordance with the same standards used in considering the
records of employees from other national origins and whether they had
considered factors which had a "disparate impact on persons of Lopez'
ancestry and for which there was no valid business purpose."7I The Commission
further sought to determine whether any of Sante Fe's employees had made
any discriminatory "errors" in compiling the records and in their subsequent
recommendations affecting management decisions.8
1216 Kan. 108, 531 P.2d 455 (1975).
2 531 P.2d at 459.
3 ld. at 463.
4 Id. at 460.
5 KA. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001 (Supp. 1974) (in part): "It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the state of Kansas to eliminate and prevent discrimination in all employment relations...."
The vast majority of states and a number of local governments have enacted similar legislation.
See J. WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (1968), for a
comprehensive discussion of the scope of authority granted by the various statutes.
6 531 P.2d at 460.
t Id. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in which the Supreme
Court dealt with similar considerations in an action brought under The Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1971).
6 531 P.2d at 463.
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Pursuant to this investigation the Commission issued a subpoena duces
tecum seeking: "Complete and total personnel records, including, but not
limited to the 'Arrest and Conviction Records,' of all employees hired into the
'Trackman' classification during the calendar year 1972...." Sante Fe refused
to supply the Commission with the subpoenaed information, contending:
1. That the information sought was irrelevant to any legitimate issue
which the Commission was authorized to investigate;"0
2. that their employees' constitutional right of privacy would be invaded
by a release of the subpoenaed information;'1 and,
3. that the subpoena constituted an unreasonable burden and was
oppressive because Sante Fe, by providing the information, would be
exposing itself to civil liability in litigation potentially brought by
its employees."2
The Sante Fe had sought and received a permanent injunction against
the Commission, the trial court ruling in favor of Sante Fe on all three of the
above issues." The Commission thereafter appealed.
In dealing with the relevancy of the personnel records the Supreme Court
of Kansas emphasized the broad scope of the Commission's investigative
power," relying heavily on Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. v. Kansas Commission
on Civil Rights." In Yellow Freight three employees, classified as over-the-
road drivers, complained of racial discrimination in Yellow Freight Systems'
employee layoff practices." A subpoena was served on Yellow Freight
ordering the production of employment histories of all over-the-road drivers
hired since January 1, 1960. One of the issues before the Kansas Supreme
Court on appeal was whether the subpoenaed information was relevant, since
the requested information encompassed a period of time some eight years
9 Id. at 460. The court treats the subpoena as though it had requested arrest and conviction
records only, even though the precise wording obviously contemplates a much broader scope.
10 531 P.2d at 463.
1Id. at 465. See Potash, Maintenance and Dissemination of Criminal Records: A Legislative
Proposal, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 654 (1972), for a comprehensive history of the right of privacy
relating to arrest and conviction records.
12 531 P.2d at 468.
13 Id. at 461.
14 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1004 (Supp. 1974) (in part):
The commission shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
(4) To receive, initiate, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging discrimina-
tion in employment, public accommodations and housing because of race, religion, color,
sex, national origin or ancestry.
(5) To subpoena witnesses, compel their appearance, require the production for
examination of records, documents and other evidence or possible sources of evidence
and to examine, record and copy such materials....
15 214 Kan. 120, 519 P.2d 1092 (1974).
16 Id. at 121, 519 P.2d at 1093.
IT Id.
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prior to the cause of action. The supreme court discussed the requisite
relevancy of records sought via administrative subpoena and specifically
approved the standards set forth in Brovelli v. Superior Court,18 which
required only that the inquiry be one that the agency demanding production
is authorized to make, that the demand not be too indefinite, and that the
information sought be reasonably relevant.1" Reasonable relevance, according
to the decision in Yellow Freight, is satisfied if there is a possibility of
relevance in the documents subpoenaed and there is no showing that the
subpoena is oppressive. The Yellow Freight court held that where the subpoena
meets these requirements, it "should be liberally construed to permit inquiry.""0
Sante Fe, however, contended that the subpoenaed information was
irrelevant because the only question raised by Lopez' complaint was the extent
to which his conviction records may lawfully be said to be job related and
that, since its reasons for termination have merit per se, the Commission's
inquiry should go no further. Sante Fe asserted that this question was not a
comparative one and therefore the subpoenaed personnel records were
irrelevant. 1 The Kansas court, in rejecting this argument, accepted the
proposition of the Commission that the controlling issue was not whether
the reasons set forth by Sante Fe had merit per se, but whether those reasons
were pretextual and reflected bias based on national origin.22 On this issue the
Kansas Supreme Court, three justices dissenting, held that the subpoenaed
employment records were reasonably relevant 2 since there was a possibility
of relevancy and since investigative "fishing expeditions" by administrative
agencies had become an accepted practice."'
1s 56 Cal. 2d 524, 364 P.2d 462, 15 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1961).
19 56 Cal. 2d at 529, 364 P.2d at 465, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 633. See also United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-54 (1949); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 202(1945); Federal Communication Comm'n v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60
MICH. L. REv. 187 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Cooper].
20 214 Kan. at 124, 519 P.2d at 1096. The majority of courts "liberally construe" such subpoenas,
reflecting the inherent difficulty of either establishing or refuting the relevance of documents
the contents of which are unknown. See Cooper, supra note 19, at 191.
21531 P.2d at 463.
22 Id.
23 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973), where the United States
Supreme Court in dealing with a similar situation in an action under the Civil Rights Act, tit.
VIII (1964), stated: "On remand respondent must ... be afforded a fair opportunity to show
that petitioner's stated reason for ... rejection was in fact pretextual. Especially relevant to such
a showing would be evidence that white employees... were nevertheless retained or rehired...."
See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296(10th Cir. 1974); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59, 91-94 (1972).
24 531 P.2d at 462. See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. University of New
Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296, 1303 (10th Cir. 1974), where the court states that:[We thus conclude that.. . [the] subpoena duces tecum is enforceable even though no
"probable cause" has been shown.... [That] which we have previously considered
administrative "fishing expeditions" are often permitted; and that administrative
[Vol. 9:2
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The dissenting opinion in essence dealt only with the issue of relevancy."'
Appearing to base their dissent more on the weight of the evidence in favor of
Sante Fe than on any viable concepts of logical relevance, the dissenting
justices refused to accept the premise that the 20 criminal convictions could
have been used as a mere pretext in order to cover up discrimination based on
national origin.2" The dissent would hold that the subpoenaed information was
not reasonably relevant to the complaint being investigated and that the
subpoena imposes an unreasonable burden and is oppressive.2- The dissenting
opinion did not discuss whether or not its view that the subpoena was
burdensome and oppressive was predicated on a consideration of any potential
civil liability on the part of Sante Fe.
The Kansas court, having decided that the records were reasonably
relevant, then directed its attention to the issue of whether or not the acquisition
of the subpoenaed records would violate Sante Fe's employee's constitutional
right of privacy.2" The court noted that constitutional rights, in and of
themselves, do not create privileges and that the Constitution only "protects
against improper invasion of such rights."' 29 The Commission contended that
the Constitution only protects against unreasonable invasions into privacy and
that the subpoena of personnel records in this case was not unreasonable.
The court, ruling in favor of the Commission, found that the "basic
requirement of the constitution and the courts is that an intrusion of a
constitutional right is permissible if reasonable."" The court did not attempt
to differentiate those standards applied to property rights from those applied to
rights involving personal liberties, but simply entered into a discussion of the
subpoenas may be enforced for investigative purposes unless they are plainly incompetent
or irrelevant to any lawful purpose.
Although there is still authority contra, "fishing expeditions" are now generally upheld. See
Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1208 (1953); F. COOPER, STATE ADMINiSTRATIVE LAw (1st ed. 1965).
25 531 P.2d at 470 (Fromme, J., dissenting).
a8 Id.
27 Id. This would of course involve a determination of fact. See Winn and Lovett Grocery Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 213 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1954); Schlossberg v. Jersey City Sewerage Auth., 15 N.J.
360, 104 A.2d 662 (1954), where administrative agency subpoenas were held oppressive. See
also Howard Savings Institution v. Francis, 133 N.J. Super. 54, 335 A.2d 80 (1975), which
deals with administrative interrogatories.
28 For a general overview of the right of privacy see Ringold, History of the Enactment of the
Ninth Amendment and Its Recent Development, 8 TULSA L.J. 1 (1972); Warren and Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); Comment, The Concept of Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 154 (1972).
29 531 P.2d at 465, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1964), which permits a "pat down" on less
than probable cause. See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), where the Supreme Court held that a finding of probable cause
need not be shown prior to an I.R.S. subpoena of tax records.
30 531 P.2d at 466.
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general right of privacy and cited Katz v. United States" and Griswold v.
Connecticut,2 as supportive of a constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. 8
In the Katz case the United States Supreme Court, in holding that
the F.B.I.'s bugging of a public telephone booth without a search warrant
constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth amendment,
stated that what a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."" The Kansas
court took note of this language, and further that: "[t]he protection of a
person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is,
like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the
law of the individual states.""6
In Griswold, the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut statute
forbidding the use of contraceptives on the grounds that the statute invaded
the constitutionally protected right of privacy of married couples. The Court
held "that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.""6
The Kansas Supreme Court in Sante Fe quoted extensively from Justice
White's concurring opinion in Griswold: 37
"Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the
state may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is
compelling." But such statutes, if reasonably necessary for the effectuation
of a legitimate and substantial state interest, and not arbitrary or
capricious in application, are not invalid under the Due Process Clause."'
The Kansas court, apparently accepting Sante Fe's argument that the
subpoena in question constituted a significant encroachment on personal liberty
then quoted Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold as containing
the applicable test: "The law must be shown 'necessary,' and not merely
rationally related to, the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.' ","9
The Kansas court, without discussion, simply stated that:
When the foregoing reasoning is applied to the instant case, we have no
hesitancy in holding... [that] enforcement of the Commission's subpoena
requiring disclosure of the arrest and conviction records... is not
constitutionally impermissible as violative of the employees' right of
81389 U.S. 347 (1967).
:12 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), holding the "funda-
mental rights" guarantee applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
38 531 P.2d at 466.
8,4389 U.S. at 351.
85 531 P.2d at 466, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
86 381 U.S. at 485. See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
3T 381 U.S. at 502.
38Id. at 504, citingZemelv. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 3 531 P.2d at 467.
[Vol. 9:2
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privacy. The public policy of this state as declared in the Kansas Act
Against Discrimination compels that the interests of the individuals
affected by the disclosure be subordinated in order "to eliminate and
prevent discrimination in all employment relations.""' (emphasis added).
It is here, again worthy of note, that the subpoena in question demanded
the production of complete and total personnel records, including, but not
limited, to arrest and conviction records. It seems, therefore, that the court has
declared that a compelling state interest must be established before arrest and
conviction records may be released, and further that the state's interest in
preventing discrimination in employment practices constitutes such a requisite
compelling state interest. The serious implications of such a holding are
essentially twofold. First, by including arrest and conviction records within the
penumbra of a constitutionally protected right of privacy, the court, by impli-
cation, is in effect denying access to such records for legitimate interests which
do not qualify as "compelling." Logically, under this standard, a prosecuting
attorney might even be denied access to arrest and conviction records, though
it is extremely doubtful that the court intended such broad ramifications.
Secondly, it would seem that by classifying the state's interest in preventing
discrimination in employment as "compelling" the court is in essence issuing
the Commission a carte blanche. This consequence is especially ominous when
considered in the light of the extremely liberal standards governing the relevance
of subpoenaed information.' It is unlikely that any prohibitions in regard to
the reasonableness or oppressiveness imposed by a Commission subpoena could
prevail when such a subpoena is justified by a "compelling state interest."
The court in its discussion of the scope of the right of privacy completely
ignored the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Katz," where the
appropriate test in regard to the scope of the right of privacy was
perhaps most clearly set forth: "[Tihe rule that has emerged from prior
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ",,
Applying this standard to the instant case, it becomes evident that the
court could have made arrest and conviction records available, while still
preserving the confidentiality of other information in the personnel files, by
simply declaring that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in regard
to arrest and conviction records." The court could have thus avoided the broad
40 Id.
41 See notes 23 and 24 supra.
42 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring opinion).
"Id. at 361. See also, United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
4" See Loder v. Municipal Court, 43 Cal. App. 3d 157, 117 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1974); People v.
Fall, 1975]
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implication that arrest and conviction records fall within a constitutionally
protected right of privacy and the broad declaration that the state's interest in
preventing employment discrimination is "compelling."
The court, after a brief discussion of the duty of the Commission to honor
the confidentiality of the subpoenaed records, 5 then took up the issue of
whether Sante Fe's compliance with the Commission's subpoena would subject
the company to irreparable damage in the form of civil liability in suits for
damages potentially brought by employees who are members of the class of
"Trackmen.""' Although recognizing that the fact that Sante Fe had
supplied the records pursuant to a court-enforced subpoena could not be raised
as a defense in either a tort action for invasion of privacy I" or an action under
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 8 the court nevertheless held that the
subpoena was not unreasonable or oppressive. 9 The court reasoned that a tort
action for the public disclosure of private facts could not be maintained
because the facts disclosed must be private facts, and not public ones."0 It
concluded that records of arrests and convictions are not private facts. Arrests
and convictions are made in public, publicized in the news media, and are
subject to pleas in open court. Considerable weight was also given to the fact
that court records are subject to inspection, with certain exceptions, by any
citizen.61 In regard to a potential federal action under Section 1983 the court
reasoned that: "Since we have determined that Sante Fe's disclosure of the
subpoenaed information would not violate the constitutional rights of its
employees, there is no basis for the employees to maintain a section 1983
Ryser, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1, 114 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1974), where the court declared that the
relationship between an accused and society does not fall within the penumbra of freedoms
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
45 531 P.2d at 467, quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1005 (Supp. 1972) (in part): "The members
of the commission and its staff shall not disclose what has transpired in the course of such
endeavors [investigations]." See also The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 552(b)(6)
(1967), which exempts personnel records from public inspection, "the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
'
6 See note 12 supra.
"T 531 P.2d at 468, citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1004(5) (Supp. 1972), which provides for
immunity for "natural persons" only.
48531 P.2d at 469, citing Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 448 (2d Cir. 1969), where the
court declared that a grant of immunity by a state is not binding on the federal courts in an
action brought under § 1983. See also Donaldson v. O'Conner, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975); Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1971). But
see Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), as to subsequent federal criminal prosecution.
49 531 P.2d at 470.
5o ld. at 469, citing W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 836 (4th ed. 1971). But see Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971), which held that conviction
records can be subject to a right of privacy.
52 531 P.2d at 469. One must wonder why the court did not develop this same argument in its
discussion of the scope of the constitutional right to privacy.
[Vol. 9:2
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action against Sante Fe in a federal court." 2 In its discussion in this area, the
court again fails to consider the fact that the scope of the subpoena in question
extends considerably beyond just arrest and conviction records.
CONCLUSION
The Kansas Supreme Court in Sante Fe has joined the majority of states
in declaring that administrative "fishing expeditions" via the use of subpoena
powers are now permissible. No probable cause need be shown and confidential
information may be subject to subpoena if there is even a mere possibility of
relevance to a matter within the scope of the agency's authority. The state's
interest in preventing discrimination in employment practices has been
declared a "compelling state interest" such as to override any claims to rights
of privacy. Although primarily discussing only arrest and conviction records,
the court in actuality upheld without modification a subpoena which was much
broader in scope." As a result of this decision personnel records of employees
who are not themselves parties to any litigation may be obtained upon a
showing of a mere possibility of relevance. It seems doubtful that a general
legislative dictate that the agency maintain the confidentiality of the records
can provide sufficient safeguards to potential administrative "witch hunts,"
especially when the legislature does not even establish penalties for the
breach of such confidentiality.'
DAvm L. HOSTETLER
52 Id. at 469.
53 See note 11 supra. See also Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights v. Carlton, 216 Kan. 735, 533
P.2d 1335 (1975) for a general follow-up of the Sante Fe case where the Kansas Supreme
Court upheld a lower court modification of an administrative subpoena.
54 See note 45 supra.
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